

The Birth of the Modern Hawaiian Movement: Kalama Valley, O'ahu

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Holding a banner lettered in bold colorful strokes, KŌKUA HAWAII ("HELP HAWAII"), some three dozen non-violent protesters were arrested for trespassing on private land on May 11, 1971, as they sat atop the last unbulldozed house in rural Kalama Valley on the Hawaiian island of O'ahu.¹ They were well aware that, in the words of one of their young leaders, Linton Park, "Hawaiian history was being made" by the very act of their resistance.²

What they could not know was that their collective effort to preserve the land rights of local people in that dry, 250-acre valley on O'ahu's east end would be remembered long after as the spark that ignited the modern Hawaiian Movement, an ongoing series of land struggles throughout the decade of the seventies that was destined to change the consciousness of Hawai'i's people, especially her native people.

More akin to the American Indian Movement than to the Black Civil Rights Movement, the Hawaiian Movement began as a battle for land rights but would evolve, by 1980, into a larger struggle for native Hawaiian autonomy. Land claims first appeared, as in Kalama Valley, as community-based assertions for the preservation of agricultural land against resort and subdivision use. By the mid 1970s, these claims had broadened to cover military-controlled lands and trust lands specifically set aside for Hawaiians by the U.S. Congress but used by non-beneficiaries.

Justification for these claims had also expanded. In the beginning of the decade, the rallying cry was "land for local people, not tourists." By 1976, the language of protest had changed from English to Hawaiian, with emphasis on the native relationship to land. The

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²*The Hawaiian Journal of History*, vol. 21 (1987).

cultural value of *Aloha 'Aina* (love of the land) was to characterize the demands of protesters into the 1980s. By then, the Movement had branched out politically to link up with American Indian activists on the mainland, anti-nuclear independence struggles throughout the South Pacific, and international networks in Asia and at the United Nations.

The Kalama struggle prefigured much of the decade to come. Many of the issues in the struggle—e.g., class divisions between Hawaiians, racial divisions between *haole* (whites) and people of color, the prior claims of local people against mainland in-migrants—were to grow in significance in later years. But the main lesson of Kalama would be the need for community resistance against the onslaught of land development. By 1980, activists would look back and see in Kalama Valley the first land struggle of modern Hawaiian resistance.

As a classic example of landless poor fighting for residency rights from the landed rich, the battle for Kalama Valley was the end result of a post-Statehood (post-1959) shift in Hawai'i's economy. From dependence on cash crops of sugar and pineapple and on military expenditures in the first half of the 20th century, Hawai'i moved to an increasing dependence on tourism and land speculation in the second half of the century. After Statehood, burgeoning tourism led to an overnight boom in hotels, high cost subdivision and condominium developments, and luxury resort complexes which necessitated ever-growing demands for land. Concentrated land ownership, a problem since the spread of plantation agriculture in the 19th century, had actually increased in the 20th century. Small landowners controlled less than 10 percent of the land. The military, the State and large private estates, and foreign and mainland American developers owned the remainder. As a result, large landlords drove up the price of land, capitalizing on the rush to commercial development.³

By 1970, nearly 80 percent of Hawai'i's residents could not afford the new units that had been built. Indeed, the housing situation was so severe, it became a major political issue in the gubernatorial election that year with both sides promising affordable housing for Hawai'i's local people. In addition to the problem of a soaring cost of living and badly lagging salaries, local people were being forced to bear an increasingly heavy tax burden to pay for the infrastructure (roads, police, sewers) demanded by the tourist industry. Meanwhile, the local political elite (predominantly of Japanese and *haole*

ancestry) moved quickly to support tourism while reaping enormous private financial benefits from their investments. The effect on residents was predictable economic strain as food, housing, land and other necessities climbed in price. Additionally, a five-fold increase in tourists since Statehood created severe population pressures on O'ahu, site of the major tourist destination of Waikiki, and home for almost 80 percent of Hawai'i's population.⁴

In this economic transformation, Hawaiians suffered particularly. By the early 1970s, the Hawaiian annual median income was \$3,000 to \$4,000 less than the incomes of the *haole*, the Chinese, and the Japanese. Nearly a third of the Hawaiians earned less than \$4,000 a year. In terms of education, Hawaiians showed nearly double the drop-out rate for the state as a whole, while only 50 percent of all Hawaiians over the age of 25 had graduated from high school. Other indices revealed what Hawaiians knew to be true: nearly half the prison population was Hawaiian; Hawaiians suffered higher unemployment than other major ethnic groups; institutional racism had ghettoized Hawaiians occupationally, limiting them to non-professional, low-paying service jobs. Hawaiians also had the worst health profile in the state.⁵

Already economically exploited and culturally suppressed, rural Hawaiian communities which had been relatively untouched during the plantation period were besieged by rapid development of their agricultural areas beginning in the late 1960s. Pushed from their rural enclaves by the developer's bulldozer, many of these Hawaiians took up residence in crowded urban highrises or in makeshift beach villages. Others moved to one of the dwindling farming valleys, such as Kalama, in the hopes of staving off the end to their slow, rural lifestyle.

Thus by the late 1960s, Kalama Valley had an estimated 150 families dependent on direct or indirect month-to-month leases from Bishop Estate.⁶ Founded in the 19th century by one of the last *ali'i* (chiefs) of the Hawaiian people, the Estate controlled 10 percent of Hawai'i's land. The Estate used these lands as a funding source for the maintenance of a private educational institution for Hawaiian children (The Kanehahameha Schools). The Estate's Board of Trustees, however, included but a handful of Hawaiians in its 80-plus years of existence because their appointment had always been made by the Supreme Court of Hawai'i which, in turn, from 1900 to 1959 had been chosen by the U.S. president and, after statehood, by the governor. Until recently, both the governor's office

and the Supreme Court were controlled by the missionary-descended, white business community in Hawai'i and its allies.

In contrast to the Trustees of the Bishop Estate, residents of Kalama Valley were poor and landless. Some were pig farmers, some were vegetable farmers, some were construction workers. Many were employed in working class occupations with marginal salaries. They lived in old wooden houses with their animals nearby (fig. 1). Piggeries existed alongside food gardens and auto repair shops in a non-urban style variously described by residents as "Hawaiian" and "local." Opposed to the austere subdivisions that were transforming O'ahu into a Southern California look-alike (fig. 2), Kalama Valley residents lived an open, relaxed life amongst relatives and friends in a community they felt to be a "pig family."

Some of the long-time residents had been in the Valley for ten or more years. Most had moved into the area after repeated evictions that paved the way for development all the way down the Leeward Coast of O'ahu from Pearl City on the west end of the island to the Lanailio Home area on the east end. The Andrew Richards family had moved to Kalama in 1964 after they were evicted by Bishop Estate from the adjacent community of Koko Head.⁷ Pure Hawaiian "Moose" Lui, the Honorary Mayor of Kalama, and his wife, had put in a request for Hawaiian Homes trust land in 1952, but, as with thousands of other Hawaiians, no lot was forthcoming. By 1971, the Luis, with their eight children, had lived in Kalama for over 22 years.⁸ George Santos, pig farmer and one of the core resident resisters (fig. 4), had been moved from place to place by Bishop Estate, angering him to promise, "They're not going to push me around no more."⁹

All had been forced into the last undeveloped valley between the rapidly growing city of Honolulu and the rural, windward side of O'ahu because land rich but capital poor landlords had linked up with wealthy developers from mainland America and elsewhere to urbanize O'ahu. Bishop Estate had made a deal with industrialist Henry Kaiser in the 1950s to develop their entire holdings on O'ahu's east end. Plans for the area were drawn up by John Carl Warnecke and Associates on behalf of the Hawai'i-based Kaiser arm, the Hawai'i Kai Development Corporation. Adopted without change by the City and County of Honolulu as the detailed land use map for the east end, the original plans called for "a combination of high and low rise apartment units, single family subdivisions, a golf course, 10 hotels as high as 15 stories and a fine restaurant overlooking Makapu'u Point." Kalama Valley was just one piece in the plan.¹⁰

Although the State Legislature had passed a resolution in 1959 asking the City and Bishop Estate to investigate the problem of relocation of families living in the areas scheduled for development, nothing was done. Bishop Estate Trustee Atherton Richards had said that such people should get 50 to 60 years tenancy, but they received month-to-month leases instead. By 1970, the City's Planning Director was saying that relocation was a "private matter."¹¹ Meanwhile, Trustee Richard Lyman replied to the resident's argument, that their eviction posed a "moral question" regarding land use and tenants rights, by stating that this was not a concern of the trustees who, he pointed out, had "no secondary responsibilities" to the primary one of "maintaining and operating The Kamehameha Schools."¹²

Thus, government, landowners, and developers had plotted the future landscape of O'ahu with barely a thought for the people on the land. In historical terms, this was just business as usual.

Most of the major commercial interests in Hawai'i—which later developed into the so-called "Big Five" of American Factors (Am Fac), Alexander and Baldwin, Theo. H. Davies, Castle and Cook, and C. Brewer—had played a decisive role in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, with the willing aid of the American military, in 1893, and in subsequent annexation to the United States in 1898. As white-owned and white-managed sugar companies, they strengthened their power throughout the 20th century by intermarriage and interlocking directorates and by controlling the ruling Republican Party. When the Democrats came to power in 1954, they gradually replaced the Republicans in the partnership. But the alliance remained the same in its outlines: land use decisions for profit.¹³

The Board of Trustees of the Bishop Estate, meanwhile, had read like a Who's Who of Hawai'i's rich and powerful since before the overthrow. All the contemporary trustees—Frank Midkiff, Herbert Keppeler, Atherton Richards, Richard Lyman, and Hung Wo Ching—had direct or indirect ties to the Big Five, especially to Am Fac, a major developer of Estate lands. They were all Republicans, and three of them were former military men. Most were landowners

Fig. 1 (top). Kalama Valley in 1970 before the Kaiser development. (Ed Greedy photo.)

Fig. 2 (bottom). Kalama Valley in 1987. (Ed Greedy photo.)

Fig. 3 (inside). Anti-development demonstration at the State Capitol in March 1971. (Ed Greedy photo.)







in their own right, and all had served on various Boards of Directors for the sugar companies, banks, public utilities, and several development corporations. At least two were members of the Pacific Club, for years a "whites only" social club. None of them had any sympathies for the land rights of Hawaiians or other local tenants.¹⁴ While most of the Valley's residents were certainly Hawaiian, many others were not. However, they all felt their way of life to be closer to a Hawaiian rather than a mainland-*haole* style of living. By this they meant not only the easy-going attitude of Valley people to living in close proximity with pigs, food gardens, auto repair shops and lots of kids and dogs, but a larger concern for people and their daily happiness rather than for money, status, and achievement. What Lyman called a "rural slum" was to Valley people one of the last places left on O'ahu where local people could enjoy a way of life not driven by the suburbanite's desire for neat lawns, fancy houses expensive cars, big fences, and unseen neighbors.

This emphasis on the "style" of local living prefigured many of the eviction struggles throughout the next 15 years. It was variously expressed as people's rights to land, housing rights, the rights of "locals" versus those of tourists, and the rights of tenants over developers and landlords. In Kalama Valley, the courage of the residents to resist eviction called forth an outpouring of support around the State.

The first group to answer the call for support came from the University. Since the late 1960s, the University had been a center of Hawai'i's protest against America's involvement in Vietnam. Many of the anti-war students who had protested the war linked their rising consciousness about American imperialism in Southeast Asia to the oppressed conditions of most of Hawai'i's people. They perceived the predominantly white-run University as part of a larger white society that kept students of color from studying their own history. For these students, demanding an Ethnic Studies program was the logical local counterpart to the demand that America get out of Vietnam and allow the Vietnamese to determine their own future. This call for self-determination was to become a familiar demand from students, communities, and especially native Hawaiians as the decade progressed. In 1970, it was to bring many supporters from the campus to Kalama Valley.

no. 4. George Santos, pig farmer, resident resister. (Ed Greevy photo.)

The first core of students had been active in Hawai'i Resistance, an anti-war group born after the March 1968 slaying of Martin Luther King Jr., and in Youth Action, an association founded by left-liberal campus ministers to bring young people of high school and college age into the social movements of the day.¹⁵

Headed by a creative young Catholic activist, John Witteck, Youth Action operated a series of small grants to seed youth projects. Members included Larry Jones, journalist and minister, who was later to become a radical spokesman for welfare rights causes; Larry Kamakawi'ole, Hawaiian religion instructor at the University who was destined to lead the Kalama Valley support committee; and Wallace Fukunaga, campus minister, who lent moral and organizing support to radical social efforts.

Among other projects, Youth Action sponsored a gathering of young people from all over the State in May of 1970, called the Youth Congress. With representatives from almost 50 youth groups including the 4-H Clubs and the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Congress took a stunningly strong position calling for the secession of Hawai'i from the United States. (The statement was an early precursor of the demand for independence that was to characterize the later years of the Hawaiian Movement.)¹⁶ Kalani Ohelo, street organizer and one of Kalama's early leaders, was radicalized at the Congress.

In the meantime, Hawai'i Resistance members had become more community oriented, reasoning that student strategies like American protests against the Cambodian invasion were insufficient to bring about social change. They felt the anti-war struggle needed to be linked with people's own experiences with oppression. In Hawai'i, this translated into a concern about over-development, the many injustices perpetrated against the Hawaiian people, and a larger worry about the future of the Islands, especially in light of the flood of tourists and the subsequent housing crisis it engendered.¹⁷

As early as 1969, Valley residents and their sub-lessees were agonizing over their own personal housing crisis while they discussed possible responses to impending eviction. Of course, many families had already left, choosing not to fight what seemed a sure loss. Others lingered on, increasingly aware of the costs of a forcible eviction in terms of arrests and damage to their personal possessions, but also increasingly angered by an Estate that was allegedly established for the benefit of Hawaiian people but that was, in practice, acting against their interests.

In the Spring of 1970, Larry Kamakawi'ole called a meeting at the Off-Center coffeehouse, a local gathering place for anti-war resisters near the University. He invited about a dozen people, most of them concerned Hawaiians, including Pete Thompson, "Soil" Niheu, and Kalani Ohelo. Together, they decided to lend their organizing skills to the residents' struggle.¹⁸ By July, the Kokua Kalama Committee (KKC) had been formed.

The historic link between campus activists and a grass-roots community could have been predicted by any keen observer of the time. On the verge of victory in their anti-war offensive, students had already made the connection between American cultural, political, and economic exploitation of Third World people abroad and the same kind of exploitation of local people of color at home. All that was missing was a community.

For their part, the residents who chose to fight were moved by experience rather than theory. Resident Andrew Richards' son, a handsome part-Hawaiian nicknamed "Black," recalled that when he met with the KKC, he told them he was tired of being "constantly on the move, like a nomad." He felt that he "had rights, more rights to be there than they [Bishop Estate] did," because he was a native Hawaiian. The residents who stayed shared his sense that they were "paying somebody else's mortgage" and "getting ripped off" in the process.¹⁹

By the latter part of June, 1970, each of 55 tenants of record had received "certificates of dispossession" which Estate officials claimed "gave them (tenants) a higher priority" on a waiting list for low-rent housing.²⁰ In the meantime, the problem of relocation was being addressed by the Lili'uokalani Trust Children's Center and a group of ten ministers from the Wai'alaie-Koko Head Ecumenical Coalition of churches.²¹ A few families had been successfully relocated, but the lack of large, low-rent, houses and of available land for piggeries created problems.

Of course, neither the Center nor the Coalition questioned the right of the Estate to evict Valley residents. Their involvement took for granted the legal and moral authority inherent in private property ownership. And the contradiction of a Trust specifically founded for the benefit of Hawaiian people proceeding to evict Hawaiians from Hawaiian land never bothered the ministers or the Center. Both groups perceived their duty to be social, not political. While they no doubt aided some people, their overall effect was to sustain a point of public opposition to the KKC and, ironically, to the left-liberal

ministers like Larry Jones who did not see Christianity as a conservative force in the service of the status quo.

As eviction day drew near, Kalani Ohelo experienced an event that would permanently change his life. One morning, some weeks after he had taken up residence in the Valley to support the tenants, he witnessed his first "eviction." He recalled the following in an interview 13 years later:

There was this one family in the Valley, a pure Hawaiian family. I forgot their name. But what happened to this Hawaiian family was what motivated me to commit my whole life to stopping development, to the Movement.

Anyway, there was this bulldozer, this Hayes security guard, and a couple of agents for the Bishop Estate. They said that the family had notices to move and they weren't moving. The agents said they had rights to evict the family and to smash everything in their house.

But the real case was that the Hawaiian brother who lived in the house just got out of the hospital that day. He was in the hospital because he had spinal surgery. He got hurt on the job, working construction. So he had been out of work for something like three months. And everything he owned was in that house; icebox, beds, children's clothes. He had nine children.

He had just gotten home that day from the hospital. And he was still hurting. You could see the physical pain. He was hunched over. You could see the pain in his face.

Then the Bishop Estate agents put him on the side and asked all the children to come out of the house. All the kids were crying and you could see the helpless look in their eyes. They were sad and angry. And they felt hopeless because they couldn't do anything about it.

Then these people, the Bishop Estate agents, who had a very cold heart, they told the bulldozer driver to go ahead and smash the house.

That's when my friends and I became physically involved with the Bishop Estate. We started throwing rocks at the bulldozer and at the Bishop Estate agents. It was the kind of experience that anybody with a little humanity in them would do the same thing. You would feel compelled to do the same thing.²⁵

A few days after this eviction, Lori Hayashi, anti-war activist and organizer, went with John Witeck into the Valley the morning of July 2nd. By noon, Witeck and Hayashi were joined by two other anti-war activists, Dana and Linton Park. With the TV cameras rolling, they entered house after house in an effort to stop the bulldozer. But to no avail.²⁶

Witeck, Hayashi, and Linton Park were arrested for trespassing, enabling the bulldozer to finish demolition of the houses.²⁴ Most residents were not in the Valley at the time. John Witeck remembers

that "people were out working or looking for other housing. It was a weekday, but to the Bishop Estate official, Ed Michael, it didn't matter whether people were out of their homes. They had received notices."²⁵

Of the few remaining residents who were present, none decided to be arrested, apparently because their precarious status would only be aggravated by an arrest. Lori Hayashi remarked at the time, "I really wish the residents were there with us. The press will say 'outside agitators' again, although the residents asked us to support them."

Beyond correctly predicting what the press would continue to say for months, Hayashi also put her finger on an issue that would plague the Movement for years to come: the use of Hawaiians against other Hawaiians. She commented about the Hawaiian bulldozer drivers: "I felt so sick! Those damn Estate bastards, sending out Hawaiians to do their dirty work."²⁶

The on-the-spot willingness of the first three KKC supporters to be arrested was followed up eight days later by six other activists and resident Dick King who confronted Bishop Estate and were again carried off by police.²⁷

Among those arrested was Kehau Lee, a young part-Hawaiian activist who had belonged to a group called Concerned Locals for Peace. Growing up in Papakōlea, a Hawaiian Homes community on the flanks of Punchbowl, Lee attended Roosevelt High School where she was greatly influenced by Setsuo Okubo, an amazing teacher of critical mind and tireless enthusiasm. Later, when Lee was at the University, she joined the Ethnic Studies struggles. By her own recollection, she began to develop a "Third World" consciousness about local people in Hawai'i which had been helped along by a two-month stint in Cuba in 1969 and by long nights of debate in a study group on the war.

When Kalama Valley erupted, Lee was part of a radical core called the "Kaimuki Collective." As a Maoist group dedicated to hammering out revolutionary thought, the Collective included Lori and Wayne Hayashi, Pete Thompson, and Herb Takahashi, among others. Thompson, a 1967 graduate of The Kamehameha Schools, was already a hard-hitting intellectual whose astonishing capacity for analysis and organizing would reach its zenith in the Waitāhole-Waikāne struggle in the mid 1970s. Takahashi, experienced organizer and founder of the group, would become one of the Kalama Valley attorneys.²⁸

Limited to local people of color, the Kaimuki Collective divided over the question of participation in the Valley's struggle. Lee and Thompson remembered that the criticisms were threefold: the struggle was insular, meaning agricultural not urban, and predominantly Hawaiian, not local; the activists in the Valley were anti-theory, meaning that their support was reactive and essentially unplanned (i.e. without Marxist ideology); and the KKC was "nationalistic," meaning that it was not inclusive of other oppressed non-Hawaiian groups.²⁹

Whether these criticisms were accurate or not, most of the Collective's members put aside their misgivings and gave their support to Valley residents. But their criticisms would reappear from other quarters in other struggles throughout the Movement. And by the 1980s, the Left as a whole would express deep reservations about the growing presence of what they and others called "Hawaiian Nationalism."

For the moment, however, the KKC was not nor had any intention of becoming a "Hawaiian Nationalist" organization. "Sol'i" Hanale Niienu recalled that other, non-Hawaiian locals wanted to participate in decision making. He himself preferred that the group be exclusively Hawaiian but believed that others did not share his wishes, including other Hawaiians. He wanted the leadership, at least, to be exclusively Hawaiian, even if the Committee itself included non-Hawaiians. But he was overruled, and the fledgling KKC had non-native "locals" in leadership. By the time of the second set of arrests, the KKC was decidedly "local" and was perceived as such by the press and the general public.³⁰

However, the perception of the remaining Valley residents as "hippies," single, mainland *haole*, and riff-raff was encouraged by Estate spokesmen and certain members of the press. Later, this perception was to create problems between the KKC and Hawaiian groups who would give their support only on condition that the number of *haole* supporters was reduced.

In September, the KKC planned a tour of the Valley. Billed as a public service, it was enormously successful. Over 2,000 people went through the Valley where signs identified the former plots of leaseholders, and told a story of each family, their occupation and residence since eviction. Calling the Valley a "disaster area," the KKC suggested a war-like devastation, something the public was hearing about everyday with respect to the Vietnam War. By turning the bulldozed rubble into an astute political comment on the

profit-motivated policy of the Trustees, the KKC elicited widespread sympathy for the residents and for the larger questions of housing and land use. The result was an escalation of a localized O'ahu struggle into a State-wide concern.³¹

Two weeks after the tour, the trial of the first trespassers ended in a verdict of guilty. The defendants attacked the Estate, claiming that the issue was "moral" not legal, and that the "Trustees should look after Hawaiian people and not kick them off Estate land." They also brought out another issue that had been graphically illustrated through the tour: housing for the poor rather than the rich.³²

Publicity surrounding the tour and the trial had been so effective that the Trustees felt compelled to respond. In the September 27th issue of the Sunday *Advertiser*, trustee Richard Lyman wrote that the 1961 agreement between the Bishop Estate and the Kaiser-owned Hawai'i Kai Development Corporation enabled 6,000 acres of "barren land" to be converted into 4,300 homesites. As part of the same development package, he predicted 2,000 more homes for Kalama Valley.

Lyman omitted, as most Estate defenders did, the presence of farmers and other residents who leased land at Hawai'i-Kai and Koko Head before these areas were urbanized as part of the Estate's development plan for O'ahu's east end. He continued, regarding Kalama, that there was no history of Hawaiian culture in the Valley, only of ranching. Farmers, who had come after the ranchers, left the area because it was "uneconomical." The problem of relocation, Lyman insisted, was being handled by the Wai'ala'e-Koko Head Ecumenical Coalition whom he praised for "doing a great job." Finally, Lyman argued that the Estate had established a policy where a "reasonable proportion of housing" was to be provided for so-called "gap-groups."

The "gap-group" argument was demolished by the residents in an October 13th letter to the *Advertiser*. They pointed out that homes in Hawai'i-Kai were being offered at \$45,000 with the lowest at \$34,000. (In 1970, these prices were far beyond what most people, including members of the local middle class, could afford.) It would be wishful thinking to expect homes in Kalama to be less. As for relocation, the Hawai'i Housing Authority had 4,000 people on a waiting list, while Hawaiian Homes had 3,000 heads of household (some 15,000 people) on their list.

The Coalition of ministers had not done such a great job. Residents gave real-life examples.

One Hawaiian family with eight children has moved in with relatives who already have six children. Another family who raised pigs is out of business, living on the sale of their pigs. . . . We offer the above cases and many more in answer to Lyman's statement: 'in most cases, when people are forced to move from their condemned areas, their lot has improved.'

Moreover, Lyman's allegation that farmers had found the Valley "uneconomical" was answered by the manager of the Island Pork Corporation who had testified before the Planning Commission in 1968 that 40 percent of the local pork industry was supplied by farms in the Hawai'i-Kai/Kalama Valley areas.

Finally, the residents tried again to make their position clear:

The point in question is this. What do we want to see in Hawai'i? More \$35,000 and up homes to fill in an already glutted market, attracting more mainland residents; or homes that Island people can afford? Do we want a 14,500-person tourist resort to take advantage of the only beaches left for local people? Do we want a second Waikiki opposite Sandy Beach?

The spectre of Waikiki had come up before during an overnight camp-in at the Valley. Larry Kamakawi'ole had asked the same question, going on to state, "We believe that Hawai'i-Kai development is symptomatic of a disease which places development and material interests over human interests and needs of the people of Hawai'i."⁸⁸

The characterization of urban development as a "disease" was to be heard throughout the coming decade. Every eviction struggle, every beach preservation effort, every fight to stop a resort would be described in terms of a battle against the "disease" of development. The metaphor conjured up an image of a "sick" society where growing numbers of the poor were cast aside for the needs of profit-hungry landowners. "Progress" became a process of eviction for low-income workers and their families, many of whom were Hawaiian. As a tourism society replaced a plantation society, urban sprawl and "new" immigrants with money forced the landless into fast-appearing slums. "Project" housing went up in the beautiful valleys of Kalahehi and Pāloalo, transforming them into ramshackle ghettos where drugs and crime stalked increasing numbers of unemployed youth. In the later years of the movement, "disease" would be used to describe tourism, militarism, and, finally, the entire cultural presence of America.

But for the moment, it was the development in Kalama Valley that pig farmer George Santos railed against. Like other resisters, Santos made many public statements in the hopes of gaining support. While Larry Kamakawi'ole and Kalani Ohelo travelled around the state explaining the issues, George Santos appeared at rallies and forums. Speaking at a University gathering on October 20, 1970, Santos warned of two problems that would become critical by 1980: the flood of "rich guys from the mainland" seeking high-cost homes, and the resulting loss of agricultural lands to expensive subdivisions.

Nine days after Santos spoke, over 500 people gathered at the State Capitol to protest the eviction of Kalama residents. Carrying banners that read "Power to the People," the rally's sponsor list included churches, established political groups, youth associations, and representatives from other on-going struggles like the Halawa Housing Movement and the Save Our Surf (SOS) organization. At the rally, the Reverend Wallace Fukunaga of the United Campus Ministry said, "We are for radical social change in Hawai'i." His remarks frightened the conservative Coalition of churches. They had publicly attacked the KKC for being "radical" in its intentions, hoping that such a statement would put an end to growing public support for the KKC. But the Coalition was mistaken. Organizational and general public support continued to grow.

In the meantime, KKC members devoted themselves to serious study, hoping to uncover the "real history of Hawai'i." As Kalani Ohelo put it, the history "about the overthrow, the old *haole* oligarchy, the Republican Party, the plantations, the origins of the Democratic Party, the 44nd. . . ." Reading and research led them to an understanding that, "these corporations—Kaiser-Aetna, the Bishop Estate—were going to make profits at the expense of families being in dire poverty."⁸⁴

Ohelo saw this education process as "de-colonization." His views were shared by others in the Kokua Kalama Committee. In the August 1970 issue of the *Hawai'i Free Peoples' Press*, a discussion among five Hawaiian KKC members was printed on two full pages. Headlined "Hawaiians Rap," the discussion included Ohelo, "Sol" Niheu, Kehau Lee, Larry Kamakawi'ole, and Pete Thompson. Remarkable for its political insight, the discussion focused on the "colonization" of Hawaiians and Hawai'i.

Kamakawi'ole began the discussion by stating that Hawaiian culture "is almost equivalent to laziness and drinking Primo beer

under a coconut tree . . . these stereotypes." In turn, every member agreed with him. Nihenu explained why many Hawaiians were on welfare and in the prisons by saying, "A lot of Hawaiians try the 'right way' but they become frustrated and give up."

What followed in response to his statement is worth repeating in full. It reveals the level of analytic sophistication, at least among the leadership, at the time of the struggle. Clearly, the language of political discourse was already heavily influenced by "Third World" perspectives, and by the civil-rights struggles on the American mainland.

Kamakawiwo'ole: Why do Hawaiians become frustrated?

Nihenu: You know why. They can't make the grade.

Kamakawiwo'ole: Whose grade?

Ohelo: The white man's.

Lee: Right. By whose standards do we judge right or wrong, good or bad, foolish or wise? Those standards are imposed on us by the colonialist power: White America, Middle-Class America, Imperialist America. . . . The question is do we recognize those values as being important? Of course not. But the whole trip with colonialism—all colonialism, not just the system that exists in Hawai'i—is that the colonized conform to the values of the colonizer. It's a matter of survival. Survival depends on conformity.

Kamakawiwo'ole: That accounts for the Hawaiians' loss of culture. . . . I think that any time a dominant culture moves into any country and rapes the country and its people, they conform the indigenous people into the image of their liking. . . . I think that's evil. White imperialism has done this in every country.

Lee: Our country had been and is being plasticized, cheapened, and exploited. They're selling it in plastic leis, coconut ashtrays, and cans of 'genuine, original Aloha.' That's capitalism. It destroys cultures by selling them right out of existence. . . . They've raped us, sold us, killed us, and still, they expect us to "behave." They are appalled as one military wife was, when their children get beaten up on "Kill a Haole Day" at school. They brought with them Christianity, and told the Hawaiians to suffer in this life in order to be blessed in the next. What a stroke of genius! Capitalism and Christianity is a hard pair to beat. While the missionaries were telling them about the land in the sky, they were ripping off the land from beneath the Hawaiians' feet. Real Christian.

Thompson: The Hawaiian culture has been subordinated and exploited by the Westerners' system of optimum profits.

Lee: Everything we've talked about leads to one simple conclusion: Colonization and its consequences. Hawai'i is a colony of the imperialist United States. Loss of cultural identity, bi-culturalism, half-passed conformity, imposed standards, and the kind of despair we see are natural results of colonialism and imperialism.

Kamakawiwo'ole: Kalama Valley is a symptom of all Hawai'i. More and more, Hawai'i is being developed for a particular economic class oftentimes excluding the people who reside here. The people in Kalama Valley know that the Valley is not being developed for them financially and culturally. . . .

To put people who love the land into low-income concrete jungles is not solving anything. It's a sick society whenever the Hawaiian and part-Hawaiian and other races who reside in Hawai'i become temporary residents with no place to call their own. . . .

I would like to call upon all Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians to get ourselves together. We have to take care of each other. We've been divided among ourselves. We can no longer afford this division.

Several groups, Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian, responded to Kamakawiwo'ole's call. Senator Nadoo Yoshinaga, Chair of the State Legislature's Ways and Means Committee, introduced a bill in the Senate proposing that the State buy the land, allow the residents to stay, and use the Valley as a laboratory to study population growth and development problems. Yoshinaga lashed out at the Bishop Estate, calling their efforts to remove Kalama tenants "merciless, unfair, and undemocratic treatment of low-income and farm residents." Yoshinaga also remarked that agricultural lands should be preserved because land was a scarce resource.³⁵

On March 11, 1971, a day after Yoshinaga's bill passed in the Senate, another rally at the State Capitol drew 3,000 supporters (fig. 3). The KKCI's public education effort was gaining momentum, giving the appearance of a forthcoming victory.

Stung by the public outcry and the legislative move, the Estate offered to relocate Santos. Unctuous and patronizing as ever, Lyman promised in an April 14th *Advertiser* story that Santos and his pig farm would be saved, but no specific location was mentioned.

The offer was characteristic of a developing Estate strategy targeted at the most visible people in the struggle. Overtures were made by the Estate to key figures—Santos, Kalani Ohelo, Larry Kamakawiwo'ole—in an effort to undermine the resistance. The offers always came as verbal promises without legal substance. While the Estate sent out William Van Allen and Ed Michael to evict

residents and publicly disparage KKC supporters, Lyman and others were trying a softer approach. Kalani Ohelo recalled that when Ed Michael made his unforgettable racist statement to residents that "in today's modern world, the Hawaiian lifestyle should be illegal," Estate Trustee Lyman was trying to "buy us off with Chinese diners at King's Garden and other places."³⁸

The strategy didn't work. While the protesters picketed at the Estate headquarters in downtown Honolulu, Kōkua Kalama supporters moved into the Valley.³⁷ By April, the Committee had decided that their concerns—for the poor, for the future of Hawaii, for land use, for the survival of Hawaiian people and culture—encompassed more than just Kalama Valley. In keeping with this larger purpose, they renamed themselves Kōkua Hawaii.

Throughout the month of April 1971, there was intense media attention given to the struggle and impending eviction. The "moral" questions of landowners vs. tenants, urbanization vs. agriculture, and "local" lifestyle versus mainland or "haole" lifestyle all surfaced in newspaper commentaries, radio shows, and television interviews.³⁸ As Kōkua Hawaii began its second week of full-time occupation of the Valley, people from other groups continued to answer the call for support. Most noteworthy were members of The Hawaiians, a State-wide association of Hawaiian homesteaders led by young, grassroots organizer and homesteader, Pae Galdeira. The Hawaiians were raising the issue of abuse of Hawaiian Homes land just when the Kalama resistance was beginning. The groups were natural allies. The Hawaiians pointed to the failure of the homestead program, while tenants in Kalama were living proof of that failure. It was public knowledge that several families in the Valley had been on the Hawaiian Homes waiting list for decades.³⁹

While over 300 supporters dug in for a siege, the number of resident families dwindled to six. Even those who remained expressed an anger born of hopelessness rather than determination. Manuel Botelho, another pig farmer, stated in desperation:

I raised pigs in what they call Hawai'i-Kai until they moved me to Kalama Valley. If they had put the farmers and all the poor people in some valley, this wouldn't happen. But they keep pushing. They pushed the farmers out of Kalihini Valley, then out of Wai'alea-Kahala. Then out of Hawai'i-Kai, then Kalama Valley. Now where?⁴⁰

George Santos raised the issue of State complicity in the eviction/urbanization process when he criticized Governor Burns by pointing

out that the "State has land in Wai'anae and Waimānalo—Why don't he give some of it to the farmers?"⁴¹

Both communities that Santos mentioned were rural, agricultural, and predominantly Hawaiian. They also contained large acreages of state and military lands that could have been made available to farmers and other local residents if the intent of the state was to allow agriculture to continue. But Santos' question was to go unanswered, at least by State officials.

By the second week in May, the Hayes Guard Service, armed and encamped, had stationed roadblocks at different entrance points into the Valley. Kōkua Hawaii responded by constructing their own roadblocks up the road a bit from the hired guards. Authorized to make citizen arrests, the guards were part of a Hawaiian-owned company of security personnel for hire. Staffed by many Hawaiians and retained by the Estate, the company's presence in the Valley was a graphic illustration of the division among Hawaiians which Larry Kanakawio'ole had decried.⁴²

Class distinctions among Hawaiians had been the subject of much KKC debate over the several months of the struggle. The hows and whys of Hawaiian divisions along occupational, educational, and income lines were part of a larger exploration of the politics and structure of class society. The painful experience of class distinctions became the agonizing reality of class confrontation within the Hawaiian community itself. Not only was the Bishop Estate perceived as a Hawaiian trust evicting Hawaiian people, but the individuals who drove the bulldozers and carried away the "trespassers" were Hawaiian. The disappointment and sorrow that many of the KKC Hawaiians felt at seeing their own people evicted was heightened by the presence of Hawaiians on the side of the Estate and the City.⁴³ In the meantime, "Soli" Niheu recalled that the media attention given to *haole* residents and supporters had been so effective that Pae Galdeira's group, The Hawaiians, offered their help only on condition that the number of visible *haole* be reduced. The question of who was to participate as support in the Valley became a large, divisive issue that reached a bitter end one night when *haole* supporters were asked to leave the Valley by Kōkua Hawaii.⁴⁴ According to Niheu and Kanakawio'ole, it was pressure from outside Hawaiian groups like The Hawaiians that forced the issue. Ohelo saw the move in a broader historical sense as a result of "two hundred years of frustration and anger" that both Hawaiians and other local people of color felt about *haole* dominance in Hawaii.

Kamakawiwo'ole remembered that the rationale was "self-determination" by which was meant the opportunity for the oppressed to direct their own struggles. In the Valley, the "oppressed" were seen as Hawaiians and other locals, not the *haole*.⁴⁵

John Witeck, a *haole* supporter who had played a key role in bringing Kamakawiwo'ole and other Hawaiians together at the beginning of the struggle, defended the split years later as a good tactical move. In his view, there were too many "*haole* long hairs" at the rallies, some of whom occupied the Valley with the KKK. Their high visibility, constantly exacerbated by the media, lent a "Woodstock atmosphere" to the occupation and angered local people in the process. The reality was that the presence of the *haole* in the struggle reminded the locals of the historic control of the *haole* in Hawaii. Moreover, Witeck recalled that one of the points in the Kōkua Hawaii'i program concerned "self-determination" for local people. Part of that effort meant, in Witeck's words, "the need to separate, to consolidate ranks."⁴⁶

Other *haole* were infuriated at the request to leave. Feeling they had faithfully supported the struggle, they perceived the request as an ill-advised separatist move based on racial divisions that would reduce ranks by half just before the eviction. Noel Kent, SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) member and Valley supporter, wrote a letter to Kōkua Hawaii'i after the split, attacking them for succumbing to the "divide-and-conquer" tactics of the establishment. The "enemy" was not just any *haole* but the landowners and their political allies.

Kent's position, shared by others, brought out a deeper characteristic than the "*haole* question" encompassed. For activists exposed to Marxist analysis and strategy, the key was a class line; that is, a united front approach inclusive of everyone, regardless of color, who struggled for the interests of the workers, the poor, the landless. For many locals coming to consciousness in a radicalizing historic period, the class line was too abstract. It didn't account for oppression along color lines. And it didn't address the strongly felt need to be self-reliant and self-determined.⁴⁷

Even while they understood the impulse to separate, Kamakawiwo'ole and Ohelo thought the move a bad one. They were not at the meeting when the decision was made, and they were uncomfortable at carrying it out.⁴⁸ Nihou recalled that he and other locals felt "good" because they had a sense of control, something that years of poverty and racial oppression had denied them.⁴⁹ John Witeck

and John Kelly, two of the most perceptive *haole* supporters who were also Marxists, supported the move as a necessary step in the historical process of class struggle. But other *haole* disagreed with the political wisdom of the move and were personally hurt at their exclusion.⁵⁰ The split had been preceded by a reorganization of Kōkua Hawaii'i along the lines of the Black Panther Party. In early 1971, Kalani Ohelo and Moanikeala Akaka, an outspoken Hawaiian woman who was destined to become one of the most radical Hawaiian nationalists by the end of the decade, had been sent as delegates to a Black Panther convention in Washington, D.C. They were exposed to Panther militancy and ideology, and they met personally with Huey Newton, Bobby Seale, H. Rap Brown, and other Panther leaders. After the convention, they went to New York where they were hosted by the Young Lords Party. There, they stayed with families in ghettos and barrios, experiencing the shock of East Coast winters in heatless New York tenements. A stopover at another gathering of activists in San Francisco on the return to Hawaii'i solidified the impact of the Washington convention.

The Panther program of community control, community defense, and self-determination was adopted by Kōkua Hawaii'i after several organizational meetings. "Serving the People" became the guiding principle, while the public stance evolved in a more militant direction. Ohelo and Akaka returned in February of 1971. The effect of their trip was reflected in the March rally at the State Capitol where most Kōkua Hawaii'i members donned black berets as a symbol of their solidarity with the Panthers and other militant Third World struggles.⁵¹

Kōkua Hawaii'i leadership underwent a change from Chair and Vice-Chair to Minister of Defense (Kalani Ohelo), Minister of Information (Linton Park), Minister of Finance ("Soli" Nihou), and other important ministries whose heads formed the Central Committee.⁵² This Panther-type of organization revealed a progression in political consciousness as well as the tremendous influence of American radical organizations. Whether this influence had any significant impact on the larger Hawaiian community is difficult to judge. But the sight of Hawaiian militants at the Capitol and on television communicated a seriousness of purpose and a pride in resistance that other Hawaiians noticed and pondered. In this way, the radicalization of Kōkua Hawaii'i was a portent of things to come, especially in the Hawaiian community. The success of other eviction struggles (for example, the Waiāhole-Waikāne struggle to preserve

farm lands on the rural side of O'ahu, 1975-1980) and of offensive cultural assertions (the Kaho'olawe 'Ohana, a State-wide group formed in 1976 to stop the bombing of one of the eight major Hawaiian islands, Kaho'olawe, by the U.S. Navy, and still active) were radical impulses that were to bear fruit as a result of the lessons learned and the questions raised in the Kalama struggle. These larger issues concerned discipline and organization as well as Hawaiian cultural alternatives to urbanization. In Kalama Valley, there was neither enough time nor collective political experience to do more than touch on these areas. As the first major struggle of the Movement, Kalama Valley was a precursor, a dress rehearsal for successful struggles a few years later. Many Kalama participants would reappear in these resistance efforts with improved organizing skills and a clearer sense of direction.

For the moment, however, the re-organization of Kōkua Hawai'i did not alter its local style. The wearing of berets was secondary to the Kōkua Hawai'i slogan, "Huli," emblazoned on every banner and leaflet. Meaning to "overturn," the Hawaiian word represented the need to transform the current political and economic system to construct a new order, not merely soften up the existing one.

An upheld *poi* pounder usually accompanied the word, signifying a Hawaiian alternative in agricultural terms, food rather than subdivisions for the rich, and in political terms, *poi* being the food of Hawaiian, not *haole*, people. (Made from the taro plant, *poi* is the traditional staple of the Hawaiian diet and in Hawaiian origin stories, taro is the parent of the Hawaiian people.) Together, these meanings pointed toward a cultural choice: "local" or "mainland." The local choice was rooted in Hawaiian culture rather than in Asian or Western culture.

In both their symbols and their organizing, Kōkua Hawai'i members felt a distinction between "locals" and the *haole*. But, curiously enough, they did not feel a distinction, at least not in political terms, between Hawaiians and other locals. Despite the fact that Hawaiians were much worse off than Asians economically, occupationally, educationally and in terms of their collective health, the dividing line followed a white vs. people of color characterization. It was not until much later in the decade that many Hawaiians would begin to distinguish themselves as "natives" while perceiving other immigrants, both whites and Asians, as "non-natives."

Part of this can be explained by the history of Hawai'i: Euro-American, or *haole* colonization resulting in Big Five or *haole* owner-

ship of Hawaiian lands and resources, and in American or *haole* government in Hawai'i. But some of this perception was also the result of the larger theoretical attack on Western imperialism that was going on all across the United States mainland in the form of anti-war civil rights protests. The "Third World" included Asians, Blacks, Indians, and, in Hawai'i, the native Hawaiian. The specifics of Hawaiian history coupled with the universals of Third World history placed the Hawaiians and other locals in a similar category. Both groups were subjugated to a culturally white society. In Hawai'i, everything, from the dominant language, dress, and educational system to the legal and land tenure institutions, is of Euro-American origins.⁸⁸

By the day of the largest and final arrest, Kalama Valley contained dozens more protesters than residents. In one sense, this was an indication of failure: the battle for tenants rights and low-income housing was lost. All but a handful of tenants had left, crushed by poverty and a lifetime of hopelessness. In another sense, a larger struggle was beginning. Not the long trial which followed, but the decade ahead when other efforts would succeed because Kalama sparked a spirit of resistance.

Despite all the Estate's rhetoric about violence and the presence of armed policemen, the actual arrest was low-key, even humorous. Singing "Sons of Hawai'i?" (The Kamehameha Schools' song), and tossing poi and oranges at the cops, Kōkua Hawai'i members faced mass arrest with passive resistance. The Estate was careful not to allow Santos to be carted off, thus avoiding his political martyrdom. Sam Lono, Hawaiian *kahuna* (spiritual guide), put a curse on the Estate while television cameras and newspaper reporters recorded the event for posterity. The *Star-Bulletin* called the protesters "gentle rebels," noting two days later that the Bishop Estate transported Santos' pigs to a Waimano area piggery.⁸⁴

While many of the pigs died from the trauma of removal, the protesters pleaded not guilty in court. The *Advertiser* editorialized that there was a "need to think seriously about land use in Hawai'i?" while giving "more consideration to different lifestyles." They pointed to a small but rising local consciousness which was lending "needed emphasis to the special problems of Hawaiians."⁸⁵ This apparently sympathetic note was surprising, given the paper's historic conservatism. The *Advertiser* had clamored for annexation to the United States back in the 1890's, printing deeply racist attacks on Queen Lili'uokalani, the deposed monarch of the Hawaiian

Kingdom. Moreover, the paper was owned by a relative of one of the white, missionary-descended businessmen who had plotted to extinguish the Hawaiian Kingdom. As the decade and the movement progressed, however, the editorial proved a temporary departure from the customary disparagement of Hawaiians and the poor in general.

A few days after the arrest, The Hawaiians picketed Bishop Estate offices, while an alleged offer of guns and other armed support from an unnamed source was made to George Santos. There were also some supposed threats to "get Van Allen," one of two Estate agents who supervised the actual evictions. Larry Kamakawi'ole reiterated the Kōkua Hawai'i stand as non-violent. But the following day a firebomb was thrown at a guard post.⁵⁶

These rejoinders were nothing more than skirmishes. "Armed struggle" was never an alternative, in fantasy or in fact. Apparently, there had been early offers of some kind of weaponry, but neither Kōkua Hawai'i, who stuck by their non-violent philosophy, nor the offering party had a plan for armed struggle. There was plenty of frustration but no real strategy for violent resistance. The Hawai'i situation was not in a revolutionary stage, nor even, despite a few wishful thinkers, in a pre-revolutionary stage.

The three months between the May arrest and the August trial were taken up with picketing at Kaiser-Aetna and elsewhere, various public education work, defense fund-raising, and a suit brought by resident "Black" Richards against the Estate. Richards sued for damages to his personal property during the eviction, but his case was dismissed.⁵⁷ Of course, Kōkua Hawai'i supported him, but their efforts, like his, were short-lived. The day Richards lost, signs outside the State building read "Locals Get No Justice in *Haole* Courts."⁵⁸ Other signs told a similar story: "Fight Developer's Disease Now," "Land for Local People," and "Land for Food-Housing, Not Kaiser-Aetna Profits."⁵⁹

In the meantime, a dialogue was developing between two classes of Hawaiians, represented by Larry Kamakawi'ole and the Reverend Abraham Akaka of prestigious Kawaihae'o Church. (The Church was founded in 1829 by the first group of Protestant missionaries to the Islands. In the ensuing 150 years, it had come to symbolize an Hawaiian institution where the last of the Christianized Hawaiian chiefs had worshipped.) Arguing that a split existed between the "have not" Hawaiians and the "have's" Hawaiians, Kamakawi'ole confronted this division by emphasizing Kōkua

Hawai'i's intention of working with people who "were losing their homes to tourists and upper-class residents." Implied that middle-class Hawaiians were represented by Kawaihae'o and Reverend Akaka, Kamakawi'ole proclaimed, "I'm not going to sit around to talk about how to improve Aloha Week."⁶⁰

The dialogue between the two had been encouraged by the spraying of a wall at the Church with the Kōkua Hawai'i slogan, "Huli." The tensions among Hawaiians that existed all during the struggle were now coming to the fore. The stage was being set where middle-class Hawaiians would have to choose between a quiet but secure status that depended on their identification with the *haole* system and an outspoken defense of poorer Hawaiians who were beginning to protest their conditions by questioning that very system. A little less than two weeks after the conversation between Kamakawi'ole and the Reverend Akaka, a long-time Japanese supporter of Gov. Burns' machine, Matsuo Takabuki, was appointed to the Bishop Estate, forcing Akaka into one of the most controversial roles he was ever to assume as spiritual guide for the Congress of the Hawaiian People. The Takabuki appointment would also become a struggle in itself, bringing together, for a brief time, Kōkua Hawai'i, The Hawaiians, and a new Ad Hoc Committee for a Hawaiian Trustee.

Just before the Takabuki appointment was announced on June 19, 1971, Kōkua Hawai'i took out a full-page advertisement in the Sunday, June 13th *Advertiser* that listed the "Kōkua Hawai'i Peoples' Land Program" as follows:

1. We must save our farm lands to grow food. We must stop the developers who want to pour concrete over everything.
2. We must stop people from moving here until we can first take care of our own local people's needs.
3. We must take care of our air, land, and water. If we kill water, nature will kill us.
4. We must get back our land from the few big landholders that have almost all of it. It was stolen from us in the first place.
5. We must use our land to house and feed our people and learn to rely on ourselves to do it—not on the mainland.
6. As a start, we demand that Kalama Valley be saved for the local people and that the tourist and high-income development planned by Bishop Estate and Kaiser-Aetna be stopped.

The program reflected all the major issues in the eviction struggle: preservation of agricultural lands, attention to the needs of local people, redistribution of land, care of the environment, and, finally, the prevention of commercial and urban development beginning with Kalama Valley. Significant resistance efforts throughout the decade would raise these issues again and again. As tourism increased the Islands' population, greatly expanding the rate of land and water consumption, evictions multiplied, resulting in an ever-widening gap between growing numbers of both the poor and the rich. But local people could no longer be counted on to move aside without a fight. The social and political costs of development would occupy center stage for years to come.

In the midst of the Takabuki controversy, the Kalama trespass trial dragged on for months. Judge Akau, who was part-Hawaiian, seemed confused and saddened by the contradictions of his role as defender of a judicial system that sanctioned the eviction and criminalization of his people. Although the courtroom was jammed with supporters who sang and cheered, the issue of the Estate's trust responsibilities was never fully explored. Larry Kamakawio'ole summarized the moral approach of the defendants when he remarked that "trespassing was foreign to Polynesia" before the coming of the *kaole*.⁸¹ Herb Takahashi, meanwhile, expressed the legal position that the 32 arrested were "discriminated against for their race and form of protest."⁸² In the end, all defendants were found guilty and given suspended sentences.

Development of the Valley proceeded with the construction of roads, expensive, large houses, a golf course, and a sewage station. Gates went up for security, given the proximity of the subdivision to Sandy Beach, a favorite local spot for surfers and weekend beach visitors. The racial division between locals and mainland *kaole* was to be preserved through reinforcement of the class division: protection of private property. But there was an ironic justice in the fate of the rich *kaole* who eventually moved into the Valley: they were rewarded with the pungent smell of their own sewage from the treatment plant across the way.

Kalama Valley residents moved in with relatives, camped on the beach, or moved to other islands where the press of development was less severe. Three residents—Moose Lui, Manny Botelho, and George Santos—died during or shortly after the eviction, illustrating the oft-noted truism that actual physical death frequently results from the destruction of a community.

Those who lived, off and on, near the sea would be joined by hundreds more as the decade progressed. Beach villages sprang up in response to urbanization and the rapacious needs of developers. "Progress," as the Democratic Party and the large landholders proclaimed, had finally come to Hawai'i with the proliferation of slums and subdivisions.

As the first prolonged resistance effort in the post-Statehood era, Kalama Valley undercut the euphoric characterizations of "The New Hawai'i" as an enlightened post-plantation society governed by consensus politics where pluralism rather than oligarchy reigned. Capitalism in the form of the tourist industry had not brought a more equitable share of the pie but had, instead, resulted in rapid overdevelopment, a severe housing shortage, rising underemployment, increasing racial tensions, and the loss of prime agricultural land. The struggle at Kalama Valley gave eloquent voice to these issues and foretold a current of resistance for more than a decade to come.⁸³

NOTES

¹ HSB 11 May 1971.

² HSB 21 April 1971.

³ Noel Kent, *Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964): 95-188.

⁴ See, for statistics on housing, Pete Thompson, "The Inside of Housing," *Hawai'i Home Journal*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1971: 19-36. The official statistics on the increase of tourists show more than a five-fold jump from 243,000 in 1959 to 1,595,000 in 1970. See also *The State of Hawaii Data Book* (Honolulu: Department of Planning and Economic Development, 1971) 76.

⁵ For statistics on Hawaiian conditions in the 1970s see *Native Hawaiian Profile: State of Hawaii, 1975* (Honolulu: Alu Like, Inc., 1979), an excellent compilation drawn from the OEO Census Update Survey, 1975.

⁶ Estimates of the number of families living in the Valley varied greatly. The Honolulu dailies hovered around an estimate of 80, but residents I interviewed put the number at well over 100. If indirect leases (subleases) and doubling up of families are included, my own figure is closer to 150 families or 400-500 people.

⁷ Andrew "Black" Richards Jr., interview, 8 Aug. 1982.

⁸ HSB, 27 June 1970. Hawaiian Homes land encompasses some 180,000 acres of land held in trust by the State of Hawai'i for residential and agricultural use by Hawaiians of 50 percent or more Hawaiian blood. Like American Indian reservations, however, Hawaiian Homes lands are generally occupied by non-Hawaiians (including the State and Federal governments) who lease and sub-lease the lands for various economic activities ranging from shopping centers and sugar plantations to airports and military training grounds. For a recent compilation of data on this Hawaiian reservation, see *The Federal-State Task Force on the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act* (Honolulu: The Task Force, 1983).

- ⁹ HA 21 Oct. 1970.
- ¹⁰ SSB & A 13 Sept. 1970.
- ¹¹ SSB & A 13 Sept. 1970.
- ¹² HSB 16 April 1971.
- ¹³ Kent, *Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence* 69-163.
- ¹⁴ I am indebted to an article by Rae Catana in the *Hawaii's Free Peoples Press*, 1970, for this information.
- ¹⁵ John Witteck, interview, Fall 1982.
- ¹⁶ Witteck, interview.
- ¹⁷ Kehau Lee, interview, Fall 1982.
- ¹⁸ Larry Kamakawi'ole, interview, Winter 1982.
- ¹⁹ "Black" Richards, interview, Summer 1982.
- ²⁰ HSB 27 June 1970.
- ²¹ HSB 29 July 1970.
- ²² Kalani Ohelo, interview, Summer 1983.
- ²³ John Witteck, interview.
- ²⁴ *Hawaii's Free Peoples Press*, 1970.
- ²⁵ John Witteck, interview.
- ²⁶ *Hawaii's Free Peoples Press*, 1970.
- ²⁷ HSB 10 July 1970.
- ²⁸ Kehau Lee, interview.
- ²⁹ This analysis was provided by Kehau Lee and Pete Thompson during personal interviews. The term "local" generally refers to anyone born and raised in Hawai'i as opposed to mainland people. *Hawai* are referred to as either "local" or "mainland" depending on where they were born and raised. But they are always distinguished from other ethnic groups, partly because white dominance in Hawai'i has been, and continues to be, the economic and political reality of life.
- ³⁰ "Solj" Nihcu, interview, Summer 1983.
- ³¹ HSB 4 and 8 Sept. 1970.
- ³² HSB 24 Sept. 1970.
- ³³ HA 1 Oct. 1970.
- ³⁴ Kalani Ohelo, interview. For an excellent political economy of Hawai'i, see Kent, *Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence*.
- ³⁵ HA 11 March 1971.
- ³⁶ Kalani Ohelo, interview.
- ³⁷ HA 17 and 20 April 1971.
- ³⁸ See, for example, the article by Larry Jones in HA 18 April 1971.
- ³⁹ "Solj" Nihcu and Larry Kamakawi'ole, interview; also HSB 22 April 1971.
- ⁴⁰ HA 21 April 1971.
- ⁴¹ HA 22 April 1971.
- ⁴² HA 8 May 1971.
- ⁴³ Kalani Ohelo, interview.
- ⁴⁴ "Solj" Nihcu, interview.
- ⁴⁵ "Solj" Nihcu and Larry Kamakawi'ole, interviews.
- ⁴⁶ John Witteck, interview.
- ⁴⁷ Noel Kent, personal letter 1982.

- ⁴⁸ Kamakawi'ole and Ohelo, interviews.
- ⁴⁹ "Solj" Nihcu, interview.
- ⁵⁰ John Witteck and John Kelly, interviews.
- ⁵¹ Kalani Ohelo, interview.
- ⁵² "Solj" Nihcu, interview.
- ⁵³ See Robert Blauner, "Colonial and Immigrant Minorities," *Nation of Nations: The Ethnic Experience and the Racial Crisis*, ed. Peter Rose (New York: Random House, 1972). Blauner gives a good analysis of white dominance in the world and the relationship of people of color, called Third World people, to this dominance.
- ⁵⁴ HSB 12 May 1971.
- ⁵⁵ HA 12 May 1971.
- ⁵⁶ HA 14 May 1971.
- ⁵⁷ HA 21 May 1971; HSB 25 May 1971.
- ⁵⁸ HSB 24 May 1971.
- ⁵⁹ HA 28 May 1971.
- ⁶⁰ HA 10 June 1971. "Aloha Week" refers to a week of festivities annually held in October ostensibly celebrating Hawaiian culture but, in practice, geared toward attracting tourists to Hawai'i during the off-season.
- ⁶¹ HSB 22 Sept. 1971.
- ⁶² HA 11 Aug. 1971.
- ⁶³ See Noel Kent's *Hawaii: Islands Under the Influence* for a good analysis of post-plantation (1959-present) Hawai'i. See also, George Cooper and Gavan, *Daws Land and Power in Hawaii* (Honolulu: Benchmark Books, 1985) for an analysis of the relationship between the Democratic Party and land development in Hawai'i. Cooper and Daws point out the predominance of the Japanese as well as the absence of Hawaiians and Filipinos as significant actors in the post Statehood period. Finally, for a sense of the Hawaiian Movement and its Nationalist direction toward the end of the decade see my "Hawaiians, American Colonization, and the Quest for Independence," *Social Processes in Hawaii*, 31 (1984-1985): 101-137.